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1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of managerial risk tolerance on corporate credit ratings. 
Since the initial issuance in 1909, credit ratings have been widely viewed as principal factors 
reflecting a firm’s credit risk, particularly default risk,1 by outside stakeholders such as investors, 
suppliers, customers, financial counterparties, regulators, and public media when evaluating firm 
credit risk (Kisgen 2007; Becker and Milbourn 2011). The literature has documented that credit 
ratings have a considerable impact on financial markets (e.g., Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich 
1992; Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay 1998; Ederington and Goh 1998; Campbell and Taksler 2003; 
Amato and Furfine 2004; Kisgen 2006). In a survey of top executives, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
document that credit rating is the second-most important factor that firms consider in their 
financing decisions. Given the importance of credit ratings, it is essential to understand the factors 
that influence credit ratings. Prior studies have extensively investigated the impact of firm 
fundamentals and accounting information on credit ratings (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Blume et al. 
1998). However, prior research has paid little attention to the role of management attributes, 
particularly managerial risk tolerance, in the rating process. Therefore, we examine whether and, 
if so, how managerial risk tolerance affects corporate credit ratings.   
We focus on managerial risk tolerance because its evaluation is one of the most critical 
aspects of a credit analyst’s job. Standard & Poor’s [S&P] (2008, 22) state that “Management is 
assessed for its role in determining operational success and also for its risk tolerance.” Ganguin 
and Bilardello (2005, 64) point out that “Management should be assessed for its operational and 
financial successes and failures, but also for the amount of risk it is willing to accept in order to 
 
1 Credit risk consists of two components, i.e., default risk and information risk. The default risk refers to the likelihood 
that borrowing firms are unable to honor their obligation to pay interests periodically and principal at the maturity, 
while the information risk, also called estimation risk, refers to the risk associated with estimating default risk (Duffie 
and Lando 2011; Chiu, Guan and Kim 2018).    
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deploy its strategies and policies.” Several recent studies also stress the importance of 
understanding managerial risk tolerance to credit rating analysis (e.g., Ham and Koharki 2016; 
Bonsall, Koharki, and Neamtiu 2017). As debt market intermediaries, credit rating agencies should 
be particularly sensitive to the implications of managerial risk tolerance since debt market 
participants have an asymmetric loss function (Beaver et al. 2006; Cantor and Packer 1995; 
Holthausen and Leftwich 1986; Morgan 2002). For these reasons, we examine the impact of 
managerial risk tolerance on corporate credit ratings. In particular, our analysis centers on chief 
executive officers’ (CEOs’) risk tolerance because they have the most influence over a number of 
corporate decisions and set the tone of the management team and the organization (e.g., Cheng 
and Lo 2006; Argenti, Howell, and Beck 2005; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013).  
CEO risk tolerance could affect corporate credit ratings via several channels: (i) its effect 
on rating agencies’ qualitative analysis of management; and (ii) its effect on the level and the 
variability of future firm value.2 As for the effect on rating agencies’ management analysis, rating 
analysts use a variety of ways, including public meetings and personal calls and visits, to get to 
know the managers of a rated firm (Ganguin and Bilardello 2005). After getting to know the 
managers, rating analysts may figure out managerial risk tolerance and perceive risk-tolerant CEOs 
to be more willing to take on business risk and financial risk and to be less likely to value risk 
management. Accordingly, they may issue worse ratings to firms with risk-tolerant CEOs. Also, 
risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to adopt aggressive corporate policies such as issuing more 
debts and making more acquisitions (Cain and McKeon 2016), which could in turn increase the 
variability of future firm value and contributes to worse ratings. In addition, risk-tolerant CEOs 
might take on overly risky projects and such excessive risk-taking could increase the likelihood of 
 
2 We use the terms “qualitative analysis of management”, “management analysis”, “management assessment”, and 
“management evaluation” interchangeably in the paper.  
3 
 
failure and bankruptcy (e.g., Koharki, Ringgenberg, and Watson 2019), thereby leading to worse 
ratings. Given the above impact of risk-tolerant CEOs on rating agencies’ assessment of 
management and the level and the variability of future firm value, we predict that a higher level of 
CEO risk tolerance is associated with worse credit ratings.  
However, one may expect that CEO risk tolerance to have a positive or no association with 
credit ratings. One possibility is that risk-tolerant CEOs can accept a higher level of risk and hence 
are less likely to give up projects that are risky but have positive net present value (NPV) (Cain 
and McKeon 2016), which could increase future firm value and hence improve credit ratings. 
Another possibility is that the majority of the variation in credit ratings can be explained by firm 
characteristics so that CEO risk tolerance may not play an important role in explaining the ratings 
since rating agencies might largely center on firm factors. Given these countervailing arguments, 
the relation between CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings is ultimately an empirical question.  
To examine the relation between CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings, we follow Cain and 
McKeon (2016) to capture CEO risk tolerance using CEO pilot status and consider CEOs who 
possess private pilot licenses to be personally more risk-tolerant.3 Following Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, and LaFond (2006) and Becker and Milbourn (2011), among others, we measure credit 
ratings based on a firm’s long-term issuer ratings assigned by S&P. Similar to prior studies, we 
convert letter ratings into numerical scores so that higher values correspond to better ratings.  
Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms over the period 1992-2016, we find that higher CEO 
risk tolerance is associated with worse credit ratings. This result holds after controlling for firm 
fundamentals, CEO risk-taking incentives, other CEO characteristics that prior research 
documents to affect (credit) risk. The result also holds after we remove the aviation industry, 
 
3 As an anecdotal support for our measure, Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk possesses pilot license and he is relatively risk 
tolerant.  
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eliminate young CEOs, and control for CEO overconfidence, managerial ability, and corporate 
governance. In addition, we include firm fixed effects and run change analyses to alleviate the 
concern about time-invariant correlated omitted variables and continue to find a robust negative 
association between CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings. To further address the endogeneity 
concern, we also conduct difference-in-difference analyses using a sample of CEO turnovers and 
its matched control sample and show that ratings get worse (better) after relatively more (less) 
risk-tolerant CEOs replace existing CEOs. Overall, the evidence suggests that CEO risk tolerance 
plays a significant role in affecting credit ratings beyond firm fundamentals and other CEO 
characteristics.  
To better understand how CEO risk tolerance adversely affects credit ratings, we next 
examine the underlying mechanisms through which CEO risk tolerance worsens credit ratings. 
Using a path analysis, we find that elevated CEO risk tolerance leads to worse ratings through two 
indirect paths: CEO risk tolerance is associated with a lower level of future firm value and higher 
volatility of future firm value, which, in turn, results in worse ratings. Higher CEO risk tolerance 
also contributes to worse ratings through a direct path: when assessing CEOs with high risk 
tolerance, rating agencies perceive these CEOs as contributing to greater credit risk for their firms. 
To further corroborate the direct path, we investigate how the relation between CEO risk tolerance 
and credit ratings varies cross-sectionally after controlling for the indirect paths. We predict and 
find that the CEO risk tolerance and credit rating relation is more pronounced when management 
plays a more important role in a firm, i.e., when a firm faces fiercer product market competition, 
operates in a high-growth industry, and has greater financial constraints.  
Our study makes several contributions. First, we extend the literature that explore the 
factors influencing corporate credit ratings. For instance, Kuang and Qin (2013) find that CEO 
5 
 
risk-taking incentives are associated with worse ratings, while Koharki, Ringgenberg, and Watson 
(2019) find the opposite. Different from these two studies that focus on risk-taking incentives that 
are imposed on CEOs extrinsically through compensation contracts, our study focuses on CEOs’ 
risk-taking preferences as their intrinsic, innate personal traits. We provide evidence that such risk-
taking preferences are associated with worse ratings after controlling for CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives stemming from compensation contracts. To the extent that intrinsic risk-taking 
tendencies cannot be easily alleviated through contracts, the risk tolerance trait can be used by 
boards of directors to identify CEOs who would potentially lead to worse ratings.   
Second, we shed new light on the growing research on rating agencies’ qualitative analysis 
in the rating process. While it is costly to hire rating analysts to perform qualitative analysis, credit 
rating agencies have always underscored its importance in the rating process (SEC 2011; 
Cornaggia et al. 2017). Extant literature provides limited evidence on the role of qualitative 
analysis in the rating process and only recently have researchers started to investigate whether 
rating agencies take into account key qualitative features, such as managerial ability, and how 
rating agencies perform qualitative analysis (e.g., Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller 2017; Cornaggia, 
Krishnan, and Wang 2017; Ham and Koharki 2016; Kraft 2015). We contribute to this emerging 
literature by examining a new aspect of the qualitative analysis, that is, rating agencies’ assessment 
of managerial risk tolerance, and by documenting its impact on corporate credit ratings. 
Third, we contribute to the emerging literature on the effect of individuals’ risk attitudes. 
Prior studies relate individuals’ risk attitudes to various legal and economic activities and outcomes 
(e.g., Collins and Schmidt 1993; Iversen and Rundmo 2002; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013; 
Hvide and Panos 2014). For example, Ehrlich (1973) provides evidence that risk-tolerant 
individuals commit more crimes than risk-neutral or risk-avoiding individuals. Graham, Harvey, 
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and Puri (2013) show that risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to undertake acquisitions, make a 
larger number of acquisitions, and receive a larger proportion of compensation in the form of 
stocks, bonuses, and options, and lower in the form of salary. Pittman, Stein, and Valentine (2019) 
show that more risk-tolerant audit partners conduct audits of lower quality. We extend this line of 
literature by examining the impact of risk-tolerant CEOs on corporate credit ratings.  
Finally, our study adds to the recent literature on the role of individual managers in a firm. 
The key argument of this literature is that individual managers influence firm behavior and firm 
outcomes beyond firm-, industry-, and market-level features. For instance, the seminal paper by 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) uses manager fixed effects to provide evidence that managerial “style” 
influences corporate financing, investment, and organizational practices. However, manager fixed 
effects capture all managerial time-invariant characteristics and fail to pinpoint specific 
characteristics of managers. Recent studies start to open “the black box” of manager effect by 
examining specific managerial traits such as overconfidence (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2005; 
Goel and Thakor 2008; Gervais et al. 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012; Ben-David et al. 2013; Kim, 
Wang, Zhang 2016), marital status (Roussanov and Savor 2014), and early life experience 
(Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau 2017). We extend this line of 
research by focusing on managerial risk tolerance, an important managerial trait that has received 
limited attention from the prior studies.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature 
and develops the testable hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and variable construction, 
and specify empirical models. In Section 4, we report and discuss the main results. Section 5 
investigates the underlying mechanisms, and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 The determinants of corporate credit ratings 
Existing literature has documented various factors that influence corporate credit ratings. 
Early studies focus on the effect of firm fundamentals such as size, performance, leverage, and 
interest coverage (e.g., Horrigan 1966; Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Blume et al. 1998). Later, 
researchers expand their focus to other firm-specific determinants of credit ratings, including 
accounting quality (e.g., Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki, and Penn 2013; Jung, Soderstrom, and Yang 
2013) and corporate governance (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 2006). Recently, studies 
have started to explore the impact of CEO characteristics on credit ratings. For instance, Kuang 
and Qin (2013) and Koharki, Ringgenberg, and Watson (2019) document that CEO risk-taking 
incentives stemming from compensation contracts are related to ratings. Bonsall, Holzman, and 
Miller (2017) and Cornaggia, Krishnan, and Wang (2017) argue that rating agencies qualitatively 
assess management and show that managerial ability is associated with better ratings.  
2.2 Implication of individual risk attitude  
Individuals’ risk attitudes have received considerable attention from researchers in 
psychology and economics. One line of research links an individual’s risk appetite to their legal 
infractions (e.g., Collins and Schmidt 1993; Iversen and Rundmo 2002). For instance, Ehrlich 
(1973) provides evidence that risk-tolerant individuals commit more crimes than risk-neutral or 
risk-avoiding individuals. These individuals either underestimate the possibility of being detected 
(Garoupa 2003; Palmer and Hollin 2004; Eide, Rubin, and Shepherd 2006; Walters 2009) or can 
figure out ways to defend the negative ramifications in case they are caught (Becker 1968; Ehrlich 
1973). Prior research also connects risk tolerance with less severe legal infractions such as traffic 
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violations (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Junger et al. 2001; Fisman and Miguel 2007; Davidson 
et al. 2015; Castillo-Manzano, Castro-Nuño, and Fageda 2015). 
 Another line of research relates individuals’ risk attitudes to various economic activities 
and outcomes. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) administer psychometric tests to CEOs and 
provide evidence that risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to undertake acquisitions and make a 
large number of acquisitions. They also show that risk-tolerant CEOs tend to receive a larger 
proportion of compensation in the form of stocks, bonuses, and options, and a lower proportion in 
the form of salary. Hvide and Panos (2014) find that risk-tolerant individuals are more likely to 
start up a firm as entrepreneurs, but the firms that they start up perform worse as reflected in lower 
sales and lower return on assets. Hrazdil et al. (2019) show that auditors charge higher audit fees 
for firms with risk-tolerant CEOs due to their concern about these CEOs’ risk-taking. Pittman, 
Stein, and Valentine (2019) indicate that more risk-tolerant audit partners conduct lower-quality 
audits and charge lower audit fees. 
Recent studies tie piloting to individuals’ risk tolerance and examine its implications on 
corporate policies and outcomes. Cain and McKeon (2016) document that pilot CEOs are 
associated with higher firm risk and the elevated firm risk arises from higher leverage and more 
acquisition activities that these CEOs undertake. Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2017) argue that 
pilot CEOs are prone to sensation seeking and combine risk tolerance with a desire for novel 
experiences; hence, they are likely to be more successful in innovations. They provide evidence 
supporting this argument – CEO piloting is associated with not only higher quantity of patents and 
citations but also greater innovation effectiveness and more diverse and original patents. Our paper 
directly relates to this recent stream of research and uses CEO pilot status to examine the 
implications of managerial risk tolerance, particularly CEO risk tolerance, for firm credit ratings.  
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2.3 Hypothesis development   
 CEO risk tolerance could affect firm credit ratings via several effects: (i) its effect on rating 
agencies’ qualitative analysis of management; and (ii) its effect on the level of future firm value 
and the variability of future firm value. As for the first effect, rating agencies emphasize the 
importance of qualitative analysis of management in the rating process and take into account 
managerial risk tolerance when assessing management (Moody’s Investors Service [Moody’s] 
2006; S&P 2008). For instance, S&P (2008, 22) explicitly state that “Management is assessed for 
its role in determining operational success and also for its risk tolerance”. Ganguin and Bilardello 
(2005, 64) also point out that “Management should be assessed for its operational and financial 
successes and failures, but also for the amount of risk it is willing to accept in order to deploy its 
strategies and policies.” To evaluate managerial risk tolerance, rating analysts use a variety of 
ways to get to know the rated firms’ managers. They are required to attend many public meetings, 
including quarterly and periodic financial analyst meetings and teleconferences, the annual 
shareholder meetings, and the occasional road show before bond and stock offerings (Ganguin and 
Bilardello 2005). Attending these public meetings provides rating analysts an opportunity to 
qualitatively assess management, particularly, its innate attributes such as risk tolerance. Rating 
analysts could also personally call or visit firm managers to further examine their strategies and 
prospects, but also to better evaluate management itself (Ganguin and Bilardello 2005).  
If rating analysts consider managers to be risk-tolerant after getting to know them, they 
could perceive these managers as leading to higher credit risk. Among the top management team, 
CEOs play the most prominent role in setting corporate strategies and policies; hence, we posit 
that rating analysts would place a significant emphasis on CEO risk tolerance. First, rating analysts 
could perceive risk-tolerant CEOs as being more willing to accept a higher level of risk both in the 
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form of business risk and financial risk.4 Second, rating analysts could perceive risk-tolerant CEOs 
as being more likely to place a lower importance on risk management and hence exert less effort 
and deploy fewer resources to risk management. For instance, risk-tolerant CEOs may be less 
prone to use derivatives to manage the exposure to foreign exchange or commodity price 
movements, which could result in higher earnings and cash flow volatility. For these reasons, 
rating analysts could view risk-tolerant CEOs contributing to higher credit risk and hence assign 
worse ratings for firms that are run by these CEOs.   
 As for the second effect mentioned earlier, CEO risk tolerance could influence firm ratings 
through its effect on the level of future firm value. Risk-tolerant CEOs might be very aggressive 
in taking on risky projects to the extent that “the CEOs’ preferences have crossed the threshold for 
risk neutrality into the risk-seeking domain” (Cain and McKeon 2016, 156). Such excessive risk-
taking could increase the likelihood of failure and bankruptcy (e.g., Koharki, Ringgenberg, and 
Watson 2019). Also, the excessive risk-taking is an important mechanism that leads stock prices 
to crash (e.g., Bebchuk 2009; Chen, Kim, Li, and Liang 2018; Kim, Zhang, and Zhong 2019). As 
a result, firms with risk-tolerant CEOs are likely to have a lower level of future firm value and 
such firms are more likely to fail to service debt obligations (failure to pay interests in each period 
and principal at the maturity) in the future, which could in turn contribute to worse ratings. 
In addition, CEO risk tolerance could affect firm credit ratings through its effect on the 
variability of future firm value. Specifically, risk-tolerant CEOs may make more risky investments 
such as investments in innovation projects (Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang 2017), which could result 
in more variable future firm value (Bonsall, Holzman, Miller 2017). Further, Cain and McKeon 
(2016) show that firms run by risk-tolerant CEOs take on more debt and undertake more 
 
4 Ganguin and Bilardello (2005, 76) state that “… the analyst’s job is to determine how much business and financial 
risk management is willing to accept and how much it employs.” 
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acquisition activities, thereby experiencing higher equity return volatility. As the variability of 
future firm value increases, whether borrowers can fulfill their debt obligations in the future 
becomes more uncertain, thereby leading to worse credit ratings.  
Dawing on the above discussions, we predict that CEO risk tolerance leads to worse credit 
ratings by adversely influencing rating agencies’ assessment of the implication of management for 
credit risk, increasing the variability of future firm value, and reducing the level of future firm 
value. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form:  
Hypothesis: CEO risk tolerance is inversely associated with corporate credit ratings. 
 
However, we acknowledge that CEO risk tolerance may not be associated with worse credit 
ratings for the following reasons. First, CEO risk tolerance could be positively associated with 
credit ratings. The agency theory argues that risk-averse managers could incur agency costs on 
shareholders in that they give up risky projects with positive NPV (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Since risk-tolerant CEOs can accept a higher level of risk, they are less likely to drop 
projects that are risky but have positive NPV (Cain and McKeon 2016). Given that managers tend 
to take too little risk in reality and often do not select all projects with positive NPV (Gormley and 
Matsa 2016; Graham 2017), risk-tolerant CEOs have potential to increase future firm value. With 
higher firm value associated with risk-tolerant CEOs, their companies are less likely to miss 
principal and interest payments (Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller 2017), which in turn reduces credit 
risk and contributes to better ratings. Moreover, risk-tolerant CEOs could be associated with better 
innovation outcomes (Sunder et al. 2017), and selling collateralized innovation products (e.g., 
patents) may help secured creditors recover more in the bankruptcy process (Ma, Tong, and Wang 
2019), which could also lead to better ratings. Second, CEO risk tolerance may not be associated 
with credit ratings. This is because rating agencies may largely focus on firm (rather than 
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management) factors; accordingly, firm characteristics could largely explain the variation in credit 
ratings and managerial risk tolerance may not have a material impact on ratings beyond firm 
fundamentals.  
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample and data 
We draw an initial sample of CEOs from the ExecuComp database during the period 1992 
through 2016. Our sample starts with 1992 because ExecuComp begins its data coverage in 1992. 
To identify whether a CEO holds a pilot license, we search for the CEO’s name at the Federal 
Aviation Administration Airmen Certification database (FAA).5 If there is no match for a given 
name in the FAA’s database, we code this observation as a non-pilot and do not conduct further 
validation. If there are at least one name match in the FAA’s database, we follow Cain and McKeon 
(2016) to manually validate and cross-check the name match by supplementing information about 
a CEO’s birth date and home address from Bloomberg, LexisNexis, and other public record 
searches. A CEO is classified as a non-pilot CEO if i) his/her name does not show up on the FAA 
website, or ii) there is a name match on the FAA website but the CEO’s birth date or home address 
does not match the corresponding record on the FAA website.6  
We obtain financial data and S&P’s long-term issuer credit ratings from Compustat, stock 
market data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), CEO compensation and 
characteristics data from ExecuComp, and CEO military background data from BoardEx. After 
further requiring the data availability for variables used in the main empirical analyses, we obtain 
 
5 Available at https://amsrvs.registry.faa.gov/airmeninquiry/. 
6 For any CEO who has a name match on the FAA website but for whom we cannot find birth date or home address 
information in order to cross-check the name match, we delete the observation.  
13 
 
a final sample of 13,020 firm-year observations that consist of 142 unique pilot CEOs and 2,432 
non-pilot CEOs. 
3.2 Measure of CEO risk tolerance 
We capture CEO risk tolerance based on whether a CEO holds a pilot certificate because 
piloting reflects an individual’s inherent risk tolerance (Cain and McKeon 2016). Extant research 
provides evidence that operating a small aircraft is in line with higher health risk as reflected in 
elevated mortality rates (McFall 1992; Cain and McKeon 2016). Hence, it is reasonable to use a 
CEO’s pilot status to capture CEO risk tolerance. If a CEO holds a pilot license, we consider 
him/her to be more risk-tolerant; otherwise, we consider him/her being less risk-tolerant. 
Empirically, we define Pilot CEO as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s 
CEO holds a pilot certificate and zero otherwise. 
3.3 Measure of corporate credit rating 
Following prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bonsall et al. 2017), we use 
S&P’s long-term issuer credit rating to capture corporate credit rating. We transform these letter 
ratings into numerical scores using two approaches. First, we follow Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
and LaFond (2006) to construct Rating1 by translating the letter ratings into seven numeric values 
between one and seven. Second, we follow Becker and Milbourn (2011) to construct Rating2 by 
converting the letter ratings into finer numerical scores, with the highest numerical rating of 28 
being assigned to the AAA letter rating and the lowest numerical rating of 4 being assigned to the 
C letter rating. A higher Rating1 or Rating2 implies better credit ratings.  
3.4 Empirical model  
 To test our hypothesis on the relation between CEO risk tolerance and corporate credit 
ratings, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate the following model: 
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 Rating = α0 + β1 Pilot CEO + ∑ βk Controls + Industry FE + Year FE + ɛ                      (1)                                            
where the dependent variable Rating is either Rating1 or Rating2, while the key independent 
variable is Pilot CEO. Both rating variables and Pilot CEO are defined as above. To address the 
concern about potential time-series and cross-sectional dependence in the data, we report Huber-
White standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009; Cameron et al. 2011). 
Our hypothesis predicts a negative association between Pilot CEO and credit ratings, implying that 
β1 is negative.  
To separate the effect of CEO risk tolerance on credit ratings from the effects of other 
variables, we include a set of control variables that prior research documents to affect credit risk 
and credit ratings (e.g., Horrigan 1966; Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Boardman and McEnally 1981; 
Lamy and Thompson 1988; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Cain and 
McKeon 2016). We use leverage (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), interest coverage (Int_cov), 
existence of loss (Loss), and presence of subordinated debt (Subord) to control for default risk. 
The inclusion of ROA, which is based on earnings, controls for not only performance but also 
earnings management correlated with performance (Roychowdhury 2006; Lee 2012). Loss firms 
and firms with higher leverage, smaller interest coverage, and subordinated debt face higher 
default risk. We also control for firm size (Size) because larger firms face lower credit risk. Since 
firms with more tangible assets tend to have higher liquidation values and lower agency costs of 
debt (Harris and Raviv 1990; Williamson 1988), we control for asset tangibility (Cap_inten). 
Additionally, we include stock return volatility (LogVol) measured by the variance of daily stock 
return as it is positively associated with credit risk (Bonsall et al. 2017). 
We also control for several CEO characteristics including age (Age), tenure (Tenure), 
military experience (Military), and risk-taking incentives (LogVega and LogDelta). Similar to Cain 
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and McKeon (2016), we expect companies with older and longer-tenured CEOs to have lower firm 
risk, as older CEOs tend to be more risk-averse and longer-tenured CEOs could operate the firm 
in a more stable manner. CEOs with a military background may inherently have a higher tolerance 
of risk or increase their risk tolerance during the period of military service and hence could relate 
to higher firm risk (Cain and McKeon 2016). CEO risk-taking incentives extrinsically imposed 
through the compensation contracts are related to firm risk and credit rating as well (e.g., Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Kuang and Qin 2013; Koharki, Ringgenberg, Watson 2019). Appendix 
provides more detailed definitions of all these variables.  
 
4. Main Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for corporate credit ratings, CEO pilot 
status, and control variables used in the analyses. The credit rating variables, Rating1 and Rating2, 
have a mean value of 3.809 and 18.413, respectively, which resemble those presented in 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Becker and Milbourn (2011). These statistics suggest that 
corporate rating is on average around BBB-. The mean value of Pilot CEO is 0.056, indicating that 
about 5.6 percent of the firm-year observations have a pilot CEO. The average firm in our sample 
has total assets amounting to $5.335 billion, a leverage of 0.313, ROA of 0.039, gross PPE 
representing 59.3 percent of total assets, and an interest coverage ratio of 12.744. About 7.2 percent 
of the firm-year observations report a loss in the current fiscal year, while 31.6 percent have 
subordinated debts. Turning to the CEO characteristics, on average, a CEO is 55.6 years old, and 
has served in the CEO position for 5.6 years. The mean value of LogVega and LogDelta is 4.044 
and 5.513, respectively, similar to those reported in Chen et al. (2015). About 9.7 percent of the 
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observations have CEOs with military experience. Overall, the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in this study are comparable to those from prior studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. 2006; Cain and McKeon 2016; Zhang 2018). 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the results of the univariate tests for the mean and median 
differences between firms led by pilot CEOs and those led by non-pilot CEOs. Firms led by pilot 
CEOs have lower (i.e., worse) ratings in terms of both mean and median values than firms led by 
non-pilot CEOs. Moreover, these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Though 
only suggestive of the underlying relation, this result is in line with the prediction in our hypothesis. 
Also, firms led by pilot CEOs are larger, have higher leverage, higher capital intensity, higher 
variance in current firm value, lower ROA, and lower interest coverage, and are more likely to 
have subordinated debt. Compared to non-pilot CEOs, pilot CEOs are younger, have longer tenure, 
are more likely to have military experience, and have a compensation package more sensitive to 
stock price changes. Collectively, the above comparisons suggest that firms led by pilot CEOs and 
those led by non-pilot CEOs differ along multiple firm features and CEO characteristics, pointing 
to the need to control for these differences in multivariate analyses when examining the relation 
between pilot CEOs and credit ratings.  
Table 2 reports the correlations among corporate ratings, CEO pilot status, and control 
variables used in the multivariate analyses. The lower (upper) triangle reports the Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation statistics. Since the Spearman correlations are similar to the Pearson 
correlations, we only discuss the Pearson correlations below for brevity. Our primary variable of 
interest, Pilot CEO, is inversely related to both Rating1 and Rating2, providing some preliminary 
support for our hypothesis. Pilot CEO is also negatively associated with ROA, Int_cov, and Age, 
but positively correlated with Size, Leverage, Cap_inten, Subord, Tenure, Military, LogDelta, and 
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LogVol. The correlation results are consistent with the univariate comparison results reported in 
Panel B of Table 1. 
4.2 Baseline results 
Table 3 presents the results of various regressions of credit ratings on Pilot CEO and 
control variables. Columns 1 and 2 only include the Pilot CEO dummy and industry and year fixed 
effects, with the dependent variable being Rating1 and Rating2, respectively. In both columns, the 
coefficient on Pilot CEO is significantly negative at the 1% level, supporting the hypothesis that 
higher CEO risk tolerance is associated with worse credit ratings. Given that no control variables 
are included in columns 1 and 2, it is possible that the coefficients in these two columns are 
dubious, as they could be driven by correlated omitted variables. To rectify this, in columns 3 and 
4 we include LogVega and LogDelta to control for CEO risk-taking incentives stemming from 
compensation contracts and find similar results. In columns 5 and 6, we further control for a set of 
firm characteristics (Size, Leverage, ROA, Loss, Cap_inten, Int_cov, Subord, LogVol) that are 
shown to be associated with credit ratings. We find that the coefficients on Pilot CEO remain 
significantly negative, regardless of the rating variables used. In columns 7 and 8, we include three 
additional CEO characteristics (Age, Tenure, and Military) and continue to find similar results. 
Overall, these results suggest that CEO risk tolerance adversely influences corporate credit rating 
beyond firm fundamentals, CEO risk-taking incentive, and other CEO characteristics.  
The impact of Pilot CEO on credit rating is economically significant as well. Based on the 
result in column 8, we find that having a pilot CEO is associated with a credit rating that is 0.684 
worse than having a non-pilot CEO, which is equivalent to 3.7% of the mean value of credit rating. 
To place the economic significance in a context, we compare the effect of pilot CEOs with that of 
other firm-specific and CEO-specific determinants of credit ratings. For example, interest coverage 
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has a significant impact on credit rating based on both theory and evidence - the coefficient on 
Int_cov in column 8 is 0.027. Given that the standard deviation of Int_cov is 19.407, this result 
implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in Int_cov would increase credit rating by 0.524 
(i.e., 0.027 × 19.407), equivalent to 2.85% of the mean value of credit rating. Thus, pilot CEOs 
seem to have a more economically significant impact on credit rating than moderate changes in 
firm characteristic such as Int_cov.  
The results on the control variables are generally consistent with those of prior research 
(e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bonsall et al. 2017; Cain and McKeon 2016; Koharki, 
Ringgenberg, Watson 2019; Zhang 2018). As for firm characteristics, both Rating1 and Rating2 
are positively associated with firm size (Size), return on asset (ROA), capital intensity (Cap_Inten), 
interest coverage (Int_cov), yet negatively associated with leverage (Leverage), the presence of 
subordinated debt (Subord), and stock return volatility (LogVol). Among the CEO characteristics, 
a firm’s credit rating improves when the change in CEO wealth is more sensitive to firm risk 
(LogVega) but worsens when the change in CEO wealth is more sensitive to firm value (LogDelta).  
4.3 Robustness checks 
 In this subsection, we conduct several tests to ensure that the preceding results of the 
negative association between pilot CEOs and credit ratings are robust to an alternative regression 
procedure and alternative subsamples.  
4.3.1 Alternative regression procedure 
 So far, we use OLS procedure to estimate various forms of our baseline regression in 
equation (1). The OLS regression treats every rating scale as equal. However, ratings may not 
work this way given their ordinal nature (Becker and Milbourn 2011). To address this concern, we 
run an ordered logit regression, which permits the rating variables to change with different rating 
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scale and hence uses data more efficiently (though it may be less robust to some econometric issues 
than an OLS regression). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the re-estimated results for models 
(7) and (8) in Table 3, using the ordered logit regression.7 As shown in both columns, we find a 
significant and negative coefficient on Pilot CEO, irrespective of whether Rating1 or Rating2 is 
used as the dependent variable. These findings suggest that our baseline results of a negative 
association between pilot CEOs and credit rating are robust to the use of an alternative regression 
procedure, lending further support to our hypothesis.  
4.3.2 Alternative samples 
We also reexamine the relation between pilot CEO and credit rating using alternative 
samples to ensure the robustness of our baseline results to the use of alternative samples. First, one 
concern is that firms in airline-related industries are more prone to hiring CEOs who have flying 
experience. While this effect is unlikely to drive the negative relation between Pilot CEO and 
credit rating that we have documented so far, we follow Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder et 
al. (2017) to remove firms in the aviation industry and then re-estimate equation (1). As shown in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, the coefficients on Pilot CEO remain negative and significant at the 
1% level in both columns.  
Second, as we construct our sample of pilot CEOs by building on the sample of Cain and 
McKeon (2016) and extending it to more recent years, one concern is that more CEOs are picking 
up the flying hobbies in recent years and our results are driven by more recent years (i.e., after 
2009) or some measurement error in our data collection process. Although there is no academic or 
anecdotal support for this claim (in particular, measurement error would bias against finding 
results), we rerun the main regressions by removing the recent years from the sample, and instead, 
 
7 We use models (7) and (8) in Table 3 as our baseline models throughout the various analyses.  
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using the Cain and McKeon (2016)’s sample. As reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, the 
coefficients on Pilot CEO continue to be significantly negative. Collectively, the evidence suggests 
that our results remain unchanged when we use alternative samples that exclude firms in the 
aviation industry or observations in recent years.   
4.4 Alternative explanations 
 Next, we address potential alternative explanations for the negative association between 
pilot CEOs and corporate credit ratings. First, one may be concerned that younger CEOs are more 
risk-tolerant and that our baseline results are driven by younger CEOs. To address this concern, 
we control for CEO age as well as CEO tenure throughout the analyses. To further alleviate this 
concern, we exclude firm-year observations with the 20 percent youngest CEOs in our sample. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the results. The coefficients on Pilot CEO in both columns 
remain negative and significant at the 1% level, irrespective of whether Rating1 or Rating2 is used 
as the dependent variable.8 
Second, overconfident CEOs may have a higher level of risk tolerance and firms with 
overconfident CEOs are likely to be rated unfavorably. This is because overconfident managers 
tend to pursue value-decreasing strategies (e.g., Cain and McKeon 2016). To alleviate this concern, 
we follow Dezsö and Ross (2012) to construct CEO overconfidence (CEO Overconfidence) and 
include it as an additional control. Appendix provides more details on the definition of this 
variable. As shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, the coefficients on Pilot CEO remain negative 
and significant at the 1% level in both columns.  
 
8 As an additional sensitivity analysis, we alternatively remove firm-years with the 50 percent youngest CEOs in the 
sample and find that the coefficient on Pilot CEO is negative and significant at the 5% level, regardless of the rating 
variables used.  
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Third, one may argue that pilot CEOs have low ability, which in turn leads to worse ratings. 
Although managerial ability is positively associated with credit ratings (Bonsall et al. 2017; 
Cornaggia et al. 2017), it is ex ante unclear whether and how managerial ability is related to 
managerial risk tolerance.9 Nonetheless, we control for Managerial Ability (managerial ability 
score constructed by Demerjian et al. 2012) in the main regressions. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 
5 report the results. The coefficient on Pilot CEO remains significant and negative, regardless of 
the rating definitions.  
Lastly, poorly governed firms might recruit CEOs with high risk tolerance and meanwhile 
receive unfavorable ratings. Even though weak governance is shown to be associated with worse 
ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006), we are not aware of any theory or evidence that relates 
corporate governance to CEOs’ inherent risk tolerance. Nevertheless, we augment the baseline 
models with four governance attributes: Board Size (Board Size), Board Independence (Board 
Independence), CEO Duality (Duality), and the voting power of insider directors (Insider Voting 
Power).10 Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 report the results of these analyses. The coefficients on Pilot 
CEO continue to be significant and negative, irrespective of whether RATING1 or RATING2 is 
used as the dependent variable. 
4.5 Addressing potential endogeneity 
 In our setting, potential endogeneity may arise from correlated omitted variables (i.e., 
certain firm-specific or CEO-specific omitted factors may be correlated with both CEO risk 
tolerance and credit rating) or reverse causality (i.e., firms with poor ratings are more likely to hire 
 
9 Given that pilot CEOs are associated with better innovation outcomes (Sunder et al. 2017), it is possible that pilot 
CEOs have higher ability. In this case, we should observe better ratings, rather than worse ratings, for firms with pilot 
CEOs. Hence, it is unlikely that the alternative explanation of managerial ability drives out results.  
10 As additional robustness check, we also include additional governance attributes such as the independence of audit 
committee, nomination committee, compensation committee, the untabulated results remain qualitative similar.  
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risk-tolerant CEOs). We address this concern using multiple approaches. First, we control for 
several firm-level and CEO-level variables that prior studies document to be associated with 
(credit) risk and credit ratings such as leverage and CEO risk-taking incentives. Second, we 
conduct a set of cross-sectional analyses in Section 5 to test whether our results are consistent with 
additional predictions regarding the situations in which CEO risk tolerance should have a different 
effect on credit ratings. The cross-sectional analyses could help assuage the concern about 
correlated omitted variables, because, for an omitted variable to explain the cross-sectional results, 
it has to influence both CEO risk tolerance and credit rating in a given manner conditional on a 
partitioning variable. To further alleviate the endogeneity concern, we use three additional 
approaches as discussed below.  
4.5.1 Firm fixed effects regressions 
While we have included various control variables in our regressions, it is still possible that 
our analyses omit some unobservable time-invariant, but firm-specific, variables that are correlated 
with both CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings. To alleviate this concern, we re-estimate our 
baseline regressions in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 using firm fixed effects in lieu of industry 
fixed effects and present the results in Panel A of Table 6. The coefficients on Pilot CEO remain 
negative and significant at the 1% level in both columns (1) and (2) where Rating1 and Rating2 
are, respectively, used as the dependent variable. These results suggest that our baseline results of 
a negative association between CEO risk tolerance (i.e., one of CEO’s innate traits) and credit 
ratings are unlikely to be driven by the time-invariant, but firm specific, correlated omitted 
variables.11  
 
11 To further check whether our results are driven by time-invariant omitted variables, we alternatively use the first 
difference specification in testing the impact of CEO risk tolerance on credit rating. That is, we take the difference 
between the current value and the lagged value for each variable in equation (1) and then re-estimate equation (1) 
using these change variables. The untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
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4.5.2 Difference-in-differences analyses 
While controlling for firm and year fixed effects effectively accomplishing a difference-
in-differences estimation (e.g., DeFond and Lennox 2016; Carpenter and Dobkin 2011), we still 
conduct difference-in-difference analyses using a reduced sample of firms that experience CEO 
turnovers and their matched control firms to further address the endogeneity concern. Specifically, 
we first identify a treatment sample of firms with CEO turnovers that lead to a change in pilot 
status (i.e., switching from a non-pilot CEO to a pilot CEO and vice versa) during the sample 
period. When a firm has multiple CEO turnovers during the sample period, we only include the 
first one. Then we select the control sample based on ex ante probabilities of CEO turnover from 
firms that have never had a pilot CEO over the sample period. We estimate ex ante probabilities 
of CEO turnover using a logit model with all the control variables in model (7) of Table 3 as the 
explanatory variables. Next, we construct the control sample by using the nearest neighbor method 
to pick firms with the propensity score closest to that of the treatment firms within the same 
industry. 
 Using this matched sample, we estimate the following OLS model:  
 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + βk 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + Firm FE + Year FE + 𝜀 (2)                 
In this equation, Post is an indicator variable that takes one for the two years following a CEO 
turnover and zero for the two years before the CEO turnover, where CEO turnover refers to actual 
CEO turnover for treatment firms and pseudo CEO turnover for control firms identified based on 
their matched treatment firms. Turnover is an indicator that takes the value of positive (negative) 
one if a firm switches from a non-pilot CEO to a pilot CEO (from a pilot CEO to a non-pilot CEO) 
one or two years ago and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined previously in detail (see 
Appendix). Note that Turnover is excluded in the regression due to its collinearity with firm fixed 
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effects. The variable of interest is the two-way interaction term Post × Turnover. Given the 
hypothesis that CEO risk tolerance is negatively associated with credit ratings, we expect the 
coefficient on this interaction term to be negative.   
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results. Column (1) uses Rating1 as the dependent variable, 
while column (2) uses Rating2 as the dependent variable. In both columns, the coefficient on Post 
× Turnover is significant and negative, suggesting that as a firm changes from a non-pilot CEO to 
a pilot CEO (from a pilot CEO to a non-pilot CEO), its credit rating worsens (improves), relative 
to a firm in the control sample (that does not change their CEOs’ pilot status). These results provide 
additional support that our baseline results on CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings are unlikely to 
be driven by the correlated omitted variables and other endogeneity concerns.  
4.5.3 Inclusion of lead and lag indicators for pilot CEOs 
 One may argue that firms with poor ratings are more likely to hire risk-tolerant CEOs to 
improve firm performance and obtain better ratings in the future. This possibility is remote, if not 
impossible for two reasons. First, although Sunder et al. (2017) document that pilot CEOs are 
associated with better innovation outcomes, no prior studies provide evidence that CEO risk 
tolerance is related to higher firm performance. Second, rating consideration should not be an 
important factor in the recruitment of top executive like CEOs and no theory or evidence suggests 
that risk-tolerant CEOs have potential to help improve firm ratings. Nonetheless, we further 
address this concern for reverse causality by using an approach modified from Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010). 
Specifically, we replace Pilot CEO in the main regression with five indicator variables: 
Before–2, Before–1, Before0, After1, and After2+. Before0 is an indicator variable that equals positive 
(negative) one if a firm switches to (switches away from) a pilot CEO this year and zero otherwise. 
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Before–1 and Before–2 are indicators that equal positive (negative) one if a firm switches to 
(switches away from) a pilot CEO in one year from now and two years from now, respectively. 
After1 and After2+ are indicators that equal positive (negative) one if a firm switches to (switches 
away from) a pilot CEO one year ago and two years ago, respectively. If a pilot (non-pilot) CEO 
gets hired due to the existing poor (good) ratings, then we should observe a rating “effect” even 
prior to the start of a pilot (non-pilot) CEO’s contract. Specifically, if the coefficient on Before–2 
or Before–1 is negative and significant, then this would be indicative of reverse causality.  
 Panel C of Table 6 reports the results. The coefficients on Before–2 and Before–1 are small 
and insignificant, while the coefficients on Before0, After1, and After2+ are large and significantly 
negative. These results suggest that there seems to be no “effect” of pilot (non-pilot) CEOs before 
they start their position, which confirms that the causation goes from pilot (non-pilot) CEOs to 
credit rating, rather than the other way around. The coefficient on Before0 is smaller than the 
coefficients on both After1 and After2+, again providing support for the causal interpretation of our 
results. In addition, the insignificant coefficients for Before–1 and Before–1, along with the 
significant coefficients for Before0, After1, and After2+, also suggest that the parallel trend 
assumption is not violated.12 
 
5. Underlying Mechanisms  
Our results thus far are in line with the hypothesis that higher CEO risk tolerance is 
associated with worse credit ratings, even after taking into account potential endogeneity. In this 
section, we explore the underlying mechanisms through which CEO risk tolerance affects a firm’s 
 
12 The parallel trend assumption is a key assumption underlying the difference-in-difference analysis. It requires that 
the treatment and control samples have the same over-time trend unless there is an intervention, like CEO turnover in 
this study, during the sample period. The multi-period dynamic analysis as presented in Panel C of Table 6 is also 
widely used in the literature to ensure no violation of this assumption (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003).  
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credit rating. As discussed in Section 2, CEO risk tolerance can affect corporate credit ratings via 
its effect on rating agencies’ qualitative analysis of management as well as its effect on the level 
and the variability of future firm value. We explore these mechanisms using a path analysis and a 
set of cross-sectional analyses as discussed below.  
5.1 Path analysis  
Path analysis utilizes a structural equation model to address the question of how a source 
variable (Pilot CEO) influences an outcome variable (Rating1 or Rating2) by decomposing the 
correlation between the two into the direct and indirect paths through mediating variables (Baron 
and Kenny 1986). In our setting, we expect rating agencies’ qualitative analysis of management to 
be a direct path through which Pilot CEO influences rating variables; we expect both the level and 
the variability of future firm value to be indirect paths (mediating variables). To implement the 
path analysis, we use one-year-ahead Tobin’s Q (Future_TobinQ) to capture the level of future 
firm value and one-year-ahead stock return volatility (Future_Vol) to capture the variability of 
future firm value.13 Following prior research that uses path analysis (Pevzner, Xie, and Xin 2015; 
DeFond, Lim, and Zang 2016), we estimate the following models:  
Rating1(or Rating2) = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + 2Future_TobinQ + 3Future_Vol                    (3A) 
+ ∑kControls  + Industry FE + Year FE + 𝜀 
 
Future_TobinQ        = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + Industry FE + Year FE + µ                                        (3B) 
 
Future_Vol               = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + Industry FE + Year FE + 𝛹                                                             (3C) 
 
In the above equations, control variables are from model (7) of Table 3 and all the variables 
are defined as before or in the Appendix. The path coefficient β1 is the magnitude of the direct path 
from the source variable Pilot CEO to the outcome variable, Rating1 or Rating2, while the path 
 
13 We use stock return volatility as measured by natural log of standard deviation of daily stock return over a fiscal 
year to capture the variability of future firm value, because it is difficult to obtain daily measure of Tobin’s Q and 
calculate its standard deviation in a fiscal year.   
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coefficient α1×β2 (1×β3) is the magnitude of the indirect path from Pilot CEO to rating variables 
mediated through the level of future firm value (the variability of future firm value). We estimate 
the significance of the indirect effect, using the Sobel (1982) test statistics. Figure 1 illustrates the 
direct and indirect paths for the above models.  
Table 7 presents the results of the path analyses using Rating1 and Rating2 as the rating 
variable, respectively. Since the results for Rating1 and Rating2 are similar, we only discuss the 
results for Rating2 in detail as reported in column 2. The direct path coefficient between Pilot CEO 
and Rating2 [p(Pilot CEO, Rating2) = -0.688] is significantly negative at the 1% level. The path 
coefficient between Pilot CEO and Future_TobinQ [p(Pilot CEO, Future_TobinQ) = -0.184] is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, suggesting that pilot CEOs are associated with lower future 
firm value than non-pilot CEOs. The path coefficient between Future_TobinQ and Rating2 
[p(Future_TobinQ, Rating2) = 0.628] is significant and positive at the 1% level, indicating that 
future firm value is positively related to credit ratings. The total mediated path for the level of 
future firm value [p(Pilot CEO, Future_TobinQ) × p(Future_TobinQ, Rating2 = -0.115] is 
significantly negative at the 5% level. This result implies that the proportion of the total effect of 
Pilot CEO on Rating2 that is attributed to the level of future firm value is about 12.6 percent [=-
0.115/(-0.688 - 0.115 - 0.108)]. 
In contrast, the path coefficient between Pilot CEO and Future_Vol [p(Pilot CEO, 
Future_Vol) = 0.040] is significant and positive at the 5% level, indicating that pilot CEOs are 
associated with more volatile future firm value. The path coefficient between Future_Vol and 
Rating2 [p(Future_Vol, Rating2) = -2.665] is significantly negative at the 1% level, suggesting 
that when future firm value is more volatile, credit ratings get worse. The total mediated path for 
the variability of future firm value [p(Pilot CEO, Future_Vol) × p(Future_Vol, Rating2) = -0.108] 
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is significant and negative at the 1% level. This evidence implies that among the total effect of 
Pilot CEO on Rating2, about 11.9 percent is attributable to the variability of future firm value [-
0.108/(-0.688 - 0.115 - 0.108)]. Therefore, among the different paths through which pilot CEOs 
affect credit ratings, the direct path of qualitative analysis of managerial risk tolerance appears to 
be the most important, with a magnitude much bigger than that of the two indirect paths, while the 
two indirect paths are similar in terms of the magnitude.14 
5.2 Cross-sectional analyses 
 To further corroborate the direct path through which pilot CEOs affect credit ratings (i.e., 
rating agencies’ assessment of management), we perform a set of cross-sectional analyses based 
on situations under which management plays a bigger role in influencing firm outcomes. 
Specifically, we conduct cross-sectional analyses based on the following variables: product market 
competition, industry growth, and financial constraints. Management should have the largest 
impact on firm outcomes when firms face intense product market competition, operate in high-
growth industry, and have serious financial constraints (e.g., Bonsall et al. 2017; Cornaggia et al. 
2017). The rationale is that management decisions tend to make bigger differences when firms 
operate in competitive environment and in financially constrained situations. Managers could also 
have a larger impact on the future direction of the firm when industry growth potential is high. 
Accordingly, under these cases, managers’ personal traits such as risk tolerance could play a more 
important role in various corporate outcomes, and thus matter more to credit risk evaluations by 
rating analysts. Drawing upon the above discussions, we predict that the relation between pilot 
CEOs and credit ratings is stronger when firms face intense product market competition, operate 
in high-growth industries, and have serious financial constraints.  
 
14 As a robustness check, we alternatively add control variables in our baseline model into equation (3B) and (3C) and 
then re-run the path analyses. Untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. 
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To test the above prediction, we follow Kim et al. (2011b) and Cornaggia et al. (2017) to 
measure product market competition using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based on Fama-
French 30 industries. A high index corresponds to low product market competition. Specifically, 
we define an indicator variable High_HHI that takes one if a firm is in a highly concentrated 
industry (i.e., an industry with low product market competition) and zero otherwise. We follow 
Bonsall et al. (2017) to identify the healthcare, medical equipment, computer, and pharmaceutical 
industries as high-growth industries and define an indicator variable HighGrowth that equals one 
if a firm operates in these industries and zero otherwise. We use the delay investment score 
constructed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) to capture financial constraints and define 
High_FinCon as an indicator variable that equals one if this score is in the top quantile of the 
industry-years and zero otherwise.15 
Next, we re-estimate equation (1) after including each of these partitioning variables one 
at a time and its interaction with Pilot CEO, as well as Future_TobinQ and Future_Vol. The 
inclusion of Future_TobinQ and Future_Vol aims to control for the indirect paths, the level and 
the variability of future firm value, through which pilot CEOs affect credit ratings and to allow the 
cross-sectional analyses to better speak to the direct path.  
Table 8 presents the regression results. As shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on 
Pilot CEO × High_HHI is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative relation between 
CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings is weaker when firms are in a highly concentrated industry 
(i.e., an industry with low product market competition). In other words, the negative association 
between CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings is more pronounced when product market 
 
15 Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) uses a textual analysis of the MD&A section of 10-K filings to derive a “delay 
investment score” that identifies firms at risk of delaying their investments due to issues with liquidity. They find that 
their measure outperforms other measures of financial constraints used in the literature regarding the ability to predict 
policy curtailments. 
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competition is more intense. Columns 3 and 4 both show a negative and significant coefficient on 
Pilot CEO × HighGrowth, indicating that the negative association between CEO risk tolerance and 
credit rating is more pronounced when firms operate in a high-growth industry. Similarly, columns 
5 and 6 show a negative and significant coefficient on Pilot CEO × High_FinCon, implying that 
the negative relation between CEO risk tolerance and credit ratings is stronger when firms face 
serious financial constraints. Collectively, the results of cross-sectional analyses reported in Table 
8 suggest that the association between CEO risk tolerance and credit rating is stronger when 
management has a bigger impact on firm outcomes, lending further support to the direct path of 
rating agencies’ management analysis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Credit ratings agencies have long emphasized the importance of assessing managerial risk 
tolerance in the rating process (S&P 2008; Ganguin and Bilardello 2005). However, prior studies 
have not examined the implications of managerial risk tolerance for credit ratings. To fill this void 
in the literature, we examine the relation between managerial risk tolerance and credit ratings. In 
particular, we focus on a CEO’ risk tolerance since he/she has the most influence over numerous 
decisions of a firm and set the tone of the management team and the firm (e.g., Cheng and Lo 
2006; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013). 
Using the possession of a pilot license to capture CEO risk tolerance, we find that firms 
led by pilot CEOs have worse credit ratings after controlling for firm fundamentals, CEO risk-
taking incentives, and other CEO characteristics. We use various approaches to address the 
endogeneity concern, including firm fixed effects regression and difference-in-difference analysis, 
and continue to find a negative association between CEO risk tolerance and credit rating. To 
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understand how CEO risk tolerance affects credit ratings, we explore the mechanisms underlying 
the relation between CEO risk tolerance and credit rating. Using path analyses, we document that 
risk-tolerant CEOs contribute to worse ratings by reducing the level of future firm value (indirect 
path), increasing the volatility of future firm value (indirect path), and adversely affecting rating 
agencies’ assessment about the implication of management for credit risk (direct path). The cross-
sectional analyses further confirm the direct path by showing that the relation between CEO risk 
tolerance and credit rating becomes stronger when management is likely to has a more significant 
impact on corporate outcomes. 
Overall, our study sheds light on the dark side of managerial risk tolerance by showing its 
adverse impact on corporate credit ratings. To the extent that intrinsic risk-taking tendencies 
cannot be easily mitigated through compensation contracts, boards of directors can use CEOs’ 
innate, personal traits, i.e., managerial risk tolerance, to identify CEOs who are likely to lead to 
worse credit ratings. 
Our study is subject to several caveats. First, piloting is one of many activities that 
individuals with inherent risk-taking tendencies could pursue; hence, our measure may have some 
noise that introduces a conservative bias into our results. Given that this bias works against finding 
a significant relation between pilot CEOs and credit ratings, our results give credence to the 
implication of managerial risk tolerance for credit ratings. Second, although we have used a variety 
of ways to address the endogeneity concerns as discussed earlier, we cannot completely rule out 
the possibility that our results are driven by some correlated unobserved (and thus omitted) 
variables that are not considered in our analyses.   
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Appendix: Variable definition 
Variable Definition Source 
CEO Characteristics 
Pilot CEO An indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if a CEO holds a pilot license, and 
zero otherwise 
FAA 
Age The age of a CEO Execucomp 
Tenure Years of service as CEO at given firm Execucomp 
Military An indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if a CEO has military experience, 
and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
LogVega The natural log of one plus the volatility 
sensitivity, where the volatility sensitivity 
is defined as the dollar change in the 
CEO’s option holdings in response to 0.01 
unit change in stock return volatility (Core 
and Guay 2002; Chen et al. 2015) 
Execucomp 
LogDelta The natural log of one plus the price 
sensitivity, where the price sensitivity is 
defined as the dollar change in the CEO’s 
stock and option holdings with regard to a 
1 percent change in stock price (Core and 
Guay 2002; Chen et al. 2015) 
Execucomp 
Overconfidence The natural log of the 
ratio of a given CEO’s vested in-the-
money option value to the CEO’s total 
compensation value 
Execucomp 
Firm Characteristics 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat 
Leverage Total debt divided by total equity Compustat 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets 
Compustat 
Loss An indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if a firm’s income before extraordinary 
items is negative in the current or prior 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Cap_inten Gross PPE divided by total assets Compustat 
Int_cov Operating income before depreciation 
divided by interest expense 
Compustat 
Subord An indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if a firm has subordinated debt, and 
zero otherwise 
Compustat 
LogVol Natural log of return volatility, where return 
volatility is calculated as the standard 
deviation of abnormal daily stock returns 
(i.e., the daily return minus the value-
weighted market return) in a fiscal year 
CRSP 
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Future_TobinQ One-year-ahead Tobin’s Q, where Tobin’s 
Q is defined as total liabilities plus market 
value of equity divided by total assets 
Compustat 
Future_Vol One-year-ahead LogVol  CRSP 
Corporate Credit Ratings 
Rating1 The assigned numeric rating score following 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 
(2006) 
Compustat 
 Rating2 The assigned numeric rating score following 
Becker and Milbourn (2011) 
Compustat 
Other variables 
Managerial Ability The managerial ability score constructed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Demerjian et 
al. (2012) 
   
Board Size The number of directors on the board ISS 
Board Independence The number of independent directors divided 
by board size 
ISS 
CEO Duality An indicator variable that equals one if a 
CEO also serve as chair of the board 
ISS 
Insider Voting Power The percentage voting power held by inside 
directors 
ISS 
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FIGURE 1 
Paths between Pilot CEO and Credit Rating Variables 
 
The figure depicts the direct and indirect paths through which pilot CEOs (Pilot CEO) are 
expected to influence the two outcome variables (Rating1 and Rating2). We expect Pilot CEO 
to directly affect the outcome variables through its effect on credit agencies’ qualitative 
assessment of an issuer’s managerial risk tolerance, and indirectly affect the outcome variables 
through its effect on the level (Future_TobinQ) and the variance of future firm value 
(Future_Vol). The following models are estimated: 
 
Rating1(or Rating2) = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + 2Future_TobinQ + 3Future_Vol             (3A) 
+ βkControls + Industry FE + Year FE + 𝜀 
Future_TobinQ        = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + Industry FE + Year FE + µ                                (3B) 
Future_Vol               = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + Industry FE + Year FE + 𝛹                                                (3C) 
 
where controls are the control variables included in equation (1); all the variables are defined 
in Appendix. The path coefficient 1 is the magnitude of the direct path from Pilot CEO to the 
rating variables. The path coefficient 1 (1) is the magnitude of the path coefficient from Pilot 
CEO to Future_TobinQ (Future_Vol). The path coefficient 2 (3) is the magnitude of the path 
from Future_TobinQ (Future_Vol) to the rating variables. The path coefficient 1×2 (1×3) 
measures the magnitude of the indirect path from Pilot CEO to the rating variables mediated 
through Future_TobinQ (Future_Vol). The predicted signs of the path coefficients are included 
in parentheses. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of corporate credit 
ratings, CEO pilot status, and control variables used in the analyses. Panel B compares the 
mean and median of corporate credit ratings and control variables for firms led by pilot CEOs 
and firms led by non-pilot CEOs. The sample period is from 1992 to 2016. All variables are 
defined in Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable N P25 Mean Median P75 Std Dev 
Rating1 13020 3.000 3.809 4.000 5.000 1.119 
Rating2 13020 16.000 18.413 19.000 21.000 3.329 
Pilot CEO 13020 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.230 
Size 13020 7.577 8.582 8.426 9.502 1.402 
Leverage 13020 0.192 0.313 0.297 0.404 0.174 
ROA 13020 0.017 0.039 0.042 0.074 0.071 
Loss 13020 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.259 
Cap_inten 13020 0.245 0.593 0.538 0.904 0.414 
Int_cov 13020 4.042 12.744 7.170 13.407 19.407 
Subord 13020 0.000 0.316 0.000 1.000 0.465 
Age 13020 52.000 55.601 56.000 60.000 6.086 
Tenure 13020 2.000 5.591 5.000 8.000 4.062 
Military 13020 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.296 
LogVega 13020 3.105 4.044 4.414 5.426 1.935 
LogDelta 13020 4.601 5.513 5.561 6.479 1.484 
LogVol 13020 -4.377 -4.015 -4.045 -3.702 0.484 
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Panel B: Mean and median differences across firms led by pilot CEOs and firms led by non-pilot CEOs 
 CEO Pilot = 1  CEO Pilot = 0  Test of differences  
Variable N Mean Median SD  N Mean Median SD  t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 
Rating1 729 3.568 4.000 1.037  12291 3.824 4.000 1.122  -0.256*** 0.000***  
Rating2 729 17.735 18.000 3.029  12291 18.453 19.000 3.342  -0.718*** -1.000***  
Size 729 8.780 8.870 1.459  12291 8.570 8.409 1.398  0.211*** 0.462***  
Leverage 729 0.343 0.327 0.189  12291 0.312 0.295 0.173  0.032*** 0.031***  
ROA 729 0.030 0.032 0.064  12291 0.040 0.043 0.071  -0.010*** -0.011***  
Loss 729 0.078 0.000 0.269  12291 0.072 0.000 0.258  0.006 0.000  
Cap_inten 729 0.648 0.636 0.417  12291 0.589 0.532 0.413  0.058*** 0.104***  
Int_cov 729 10.691 5.490 17.720  12291 12.866 7.294 19.497  -2.175*** -1.804***  
Subord 729 0.383 0.000 0.486  12291 0.312 0.000 0.463  0.071*** 0.000***  
Age 729 55.081 55.000 6.946  12291 55.631 56.000 6.030  -0.551*** -1.000**  
Tenure 729 5.951 5.000 4.173  12291 5.569 5.000 4.054  0.381*** 0.000**  
Military 729 0.209 0.000 0.407  12291 0.090 0.000 0.286  0.118*** 0.000***  
LogVega 729 4.121 4.516 1.938  12291 4.039 4.408 1.935  0.082 0.108  
LogDelta 729 5.645 5.621 1.659  12291 5.505 5.559 1.473  0.139*** 0.062*  
LogVol 729 -3.970 -3.978 0.501  12291 -4.017 -4.048 0.482  0.048*** 0.007***  
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Table 2 Correlations   
This table presents the correlation matrix. The lower (upper) triangle reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation statistics. The sample period is 
from 1992 to 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests.  
 
Pilot CEO Rating1 Rating2 Size Leverage ROA Loss Cap_inten Int_Cov Subord Age Tenure Military LogVega LogDelta LogVol 
Pilot CEO  -0.049*** -0.048*** 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.054*** 0.006 0.035*** -0.058*** 0.035*** -0.019** 0.022** 0.092*** 0.011 0.015* 0.023*** 
Rating1 -0.053***  0.968*** 0.468*** -0.333*** 0.375*** -0.328*** -0.020** 0.492*** -0.130*** 0.100*** -0.037*** 0.052*** 0.345*** 0.307*** -0.500*** 
Rating2 -0.050*** 0.973***  0.478*** -0.334*** 0.391*** -0.334*** -0.015* 0.504*** -0.134*** 0.102*** -0.039*** 0.051*** 0.348*** 0.314*** -0.516*** 
Size 0.035*** 0.478*** 0.489***  -0.121*** 0.010 -0.096*** -0.090*** 0.140*** -0.043*** 0.117*** 0.054*** 0.011 0.434*** 0.444*** -0.381*** 
Leverage 0.042*** -0.346*** -0.348*** -0.116***  -0.282*** 0.177*** 0.207*** -0.653*** 0.224*** -0.043*** -0.012 -0.005 -0.157*** -0.170*** 0.148*** 
ROA -0.034*** 0.397*** 0.410*** 0.071*** -0.249***  -0.417*** -0.058*** 0.700*** -0.264*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.069*** 0.227*** 0.336*** -0.309*** 
Loss 0.006 -0.346*** -0.355*** -0.101*** 0.205*** -0.493***  0.063*** -0.355*** 0.058*** -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.115*** -0.174*** 0.306*** 
Cap_inten 0.032*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.100*** 0.174*** -0.090*** 0.076***  -0.147*** 0.054*** 0.048*** -0.070*** 0.017* -0.182*** -0.258*** 0.020** 
Int_cov -0.026*** 0.284*** 0.291*** 0.073*** -0.444*** 0.378*** -0.152*** -0.104***  -0.344*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.288*** 0.366*** -0.339*** 
Subord 0.035*** -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.025*** 0.211*** -0.187*** 0.058*** 0.063*** -0.189***  -0.035*** -0.058*** -0.028*** -0.161*** -0.144*** 0.080*** 
Age -0.021** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.127*** -0.042*** 0.045*** -0.058*** 0.040*** 0.009 -0.032***  0.272*** 0.145*** 0.047*** 0.109*** -0.136*** 
Tenure 0.022** -0.059*** -0.062*** 0.051*** -0.002 0.018** -0.033*** -0.062*** 0.017* -0.057*** 0.276***  0.040*** 0.146*** 0.300*** -0.086*** 
Military 0.092*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.020** -0.010 0.061*** -0.037*** 0.000 0.053*** -0.028*** 0.147*** 0.047***  0.044*** 0.076*** -0.071*** 
LogVega 0.010 0.288*** 0.291*** 0.339*** -0.142*** 0.188*** -0.097*** -0.163*** 0.144*** -0.142*** 0.017* 0.080*** 0.024***  0.680*** -0.204*** 
LogDelta 0.022** 0.295*** 0.304*** 0.433*** -0.160*** 0.317*** -0.181*** -0.255*** 0.231*** -0.144*** 0.105*** 0.289*** 0.081*** 0.600***  -0.256*** 
LogVol 0.023*** -0.517*** -0.531*** -0.372*** 0.190*** -0.392*** 0.351*** 0.027*** -0.146*** 0.087*** -0.140*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.151*** -0.259***  
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Table 3 Pilot CEO and corporate credit ratings 
This table reports the OLS regressions of credit rating variables on Pilot CEO and control variables. The sample period is from 1992 to 2016. All 
variables are defined in Appendix. Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 
         
Pilot CEO -0.282*** -0.780*** -0.335*** -0.941*** -0.252*** -0.688*** -0.251*** -0.684*** 
 (0.100) (0.293) (0.0882) (0.255) (0.056) (0.161) (0.056) (0.162) 
Size     0.303*** 0.918*** 0.304*** 0.922*** 
     (0.017) (0.051) (0.017) (0.051) 
Leverage     -0.004* -0.011 -0.004* -0.011 
     (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) 
ROA     1.921*** 5.952*** 1.946*** 6.025*** 
     (0.214) (0.618) (0.213) (0.618) 
Loss     -0.040 -0.137 -0.037 -0.128 
     (0.034) (0.095) (0.033) (0.095) 
Cap_inten     0.097** 0.341** 0.094** 0.333** 
     (0.047) (0.141) (0.047) (0.141) 
Int_cov     0.009*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.027*** 
     (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Subord     -0.282*** -0.872*** -0.282*** -0.872*** 
     (0.037) (0.112) (0.037) (0.111) 
LogVol     -1.095*** -3.369*** -1.094*** -3.368*** 
     (0.039) (0.115) (0.039) (0.115) 
LogVega   0.112*** 0.328*** 0.023*** 0.057** 0.024*** 0.059** 
   (0.0140) (0.0422) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.024) 
LogDelta   0.204*** 0.628*** -0.026** -0.075** -0.031** -0.089** 
   (0.0198) (0.0600) (0.012) (0.035) (0.012) (0.037) 
45 
 
Age       0.002 0.005 
       (0.002) (0.006) 
Tenure       0.004 0.010 
       (0.003) (0.009) 
Military       -0.013 -0.053 
       (0.042) (0.124) 
         
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.134 0.142 0.275 0.288 0.648 0.683 0.649 0.683 
# of Obs 13,020 13,020 13,020 13,020 13,020 13,020 13,020 13,020 
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Table 4 Robustness Check  
This table presents the regression results of robustness checks for the relation between Pilot CEOs and corporate credit ratings. Columns 1-2 report 
the results using ordered logit regressions. Columns 3-4 report the results after excluding the aviation industry (SIC 3720-3730, SIC 4500-4600).  
The sample period for the first four columns is from 1992 to 2016. Columns 5-6 report the results using the sample of CEOs from Cain and 
McKeon (2016). All variables are defined in Appendix. Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 Ordered Logit Excluding Aviation Industry Cain and McKeon (2016) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 
       
Pilot CEO -0.754*** -0.650*** -0.230*** -0.614*** -0.204*** -0.641*** 
 (0.171) (0.159) (0.057) (0.165) (0.078) (0.219) 
Size 0.913*** 0.874*** 0.307*** 0.932*** 0.294*** 0.903*** 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.017) (0.052) (0.021) (0.063) 
Leverage -0.014** -0.014** -0.004* -0.011 -0.003 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) 
ROA 7.226*** 7.035*** 1.965*** 6.093*** 2.234*** 6.993*** 
 (0.754) (0.687) (0.216) (0.625) (0.270) (0.801) 
Loss -0.093 -0.140 -0.036 -0.121 -0.024 -0.086 
 (0.103) (0.094) (0.034) (0.096) (0.043) (0.122) 
Cap_inten 0.275* 0.296** 0.089* 0.320** 0.098 0.331* 
 (0.144) (0.137) (0.048) (0.143) (0.059) (0.180) 
Int_cov 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.009*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Subord -0.902*** -0.890*** -0.281*** -0.870*** -0.292*** -0.891*** 
 (0.110) (0.101) (0.037) (0.114) (0.043) (0.129) 
LogVol -3.374*** -3.361*** -1.082*** -3.324*** -1.161*** -3.560*** 
 (0.113) (0.103) (0.039) (0.115) (0.047) (0.140) 
LogVega 0.076*** 0.059** 0.022*** 0.053** 0.017 0.040 
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 (0.025) (0.023) (0.008) (0.024) (0.011) (0.032) 
LogDelta -0.079** -0.070** -0.028** -0.081** -0.025* -0.081* 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.013) (0.038) (0.015) (0.044) 
Age 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) 
Tenure 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.026* 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.015) 
Military -0.028 -0.044 -0.016 -0.069 -0.036 -0.105 
 (0.122) (0.115) (0.042) (0.123) (0.052) (0.158) 
Constant   0.713*** 9.047*** 0.749*** 9.061*** 
   (0.199) (0.588) (0.238) (0.696) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.351 0.230     
Adjusted R-squared   0.647 0.681 0.643 0.678 
Observations 13,020 13,020 12,714 12,714 8,747 8,747 
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Table 5 Alternative explanations 
This table presents the regression results of the analyses used to address the alternative explanations for the observed relation between pilot CEOs 
and corporate credit ratings. Columns 1-2 report the results after excluding the 20% of youngest CEOs. Columns 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 report the results 
after controlling for CEO overconfidence, managerial ability, and corporate governance, respectively. The sample period is from 1992 to 2016 
with the exception that the sample period after controlling for corporate governance is from 1996 to 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. 
Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
 
 Excluding 20% of 
Youngest CEOs 
Controlling for CEO 
Overconfidence 
 Controlling for Managerial 
Ability 
Controlling for Governance 
Attributes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2  Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 
          
Pilot CEO -0.257*** -0.688*** -0.251*** -0.684***  -0.316*** -0.852*** -0.275*** -0.763*** 
 (0.063) (0.179) (0.056) (0.161)  (0.0607) (0.174) (0.070) (0.199) 
Size 0.296*** 0.902*** 0.300*** 0.911***  0.303*** 0.926*** 0.267*** 0.843*** 
 (0.018) (0.053) (0.017) (0.051)  (0.0179) (0.0537) (0.021) (0.062) 
Leverage -0.003 -0.007 -0.004* -0.011  -0.00528*** -0.0149*** 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)  (0.00173) (0.00514) (0.004) (0.011) 
ROA 2.077*** 6.373*** 1.972*** 6.091***  1.611*** 5.112*** 2.260*** 6.684*** 
 (0.252) (0.734) (0.214) (0.620)  (0.214) (0.627) (0.282) (0.854) 
Loss -0.006 -0.048 -0.038 -0.132  -0.0141 -0.0654 0.063 0.151 
 (0.038) (0.110) (0.033) (0.094)  (0.0339) (0.0955) (0.045) (0.127) 
Cap_inten 0.119** 0.413*** 0.093* 0.329**  0.119** 0.429*** 0.122** 0.469** 
 (0.051) (0.153) (0.047) (0.141)  (0.0492) (0.146) (0.062) (0.184) 
Int_cov 0.010*** 0.030*** 0.009*** 0.027***  0.00854*** 0.0252*** 0.009*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.00101) (0.00300) (0.001) (0.004) 
Subord -0.275*** -0.850*** -0.281*** -0.869***  -0.297*** -0.914*** -0.287*** -0.894*** 
 (0.041) (0.125) (0.036) (0.111)  (0.0345) (0.103) (0.042) (0.124) 
LogVol -1.091*** -3.376*** -1.095*** -3.371***  -1.091*** -3.369*** -1.043*** -3.232*** 
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 (0.043) (0.127) (0.039) (0.115)  -0.316*** -0.852*** -0.275*** -0.763*** 
LogVega 0.019** 0.048* 0.026*** 0.065***  0.0340*** 0.0900*** 0.009 0.017 
 (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.024)  (0.00886) (0.0257) (0.011) (0.032) 
LogDelta -0.012 -0.043 -0.020 -0.062  -0.0259* -0.0791** -0.007 -0.035 
 (0.014) (0.040) (0.013) (0.039)  (0.0136) (0.0397) (0.016) (0.046) 
Age -0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.005  0.00171 0.00338 0.000 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)  (0.00232) (0.00669) (0.003) (0.008) 
Tenure 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.011  0.00375 0.0118 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009)  (0.00342) (0.0103) (0.005) (0.014) 
Military 0.000 -0.036 -0.014 -0.056  0.0121 0.00850 -0.048 -0.156 
 (0.044) (0.131) (0.041) (0.123)  (0.0457) (0.137) (0.053) (0.160) 
CEO Overconfidence   -0.045** -0.118**      
   (0.018) (0.050)      
Managerial Ability      0.516*** 1.474***   
      (0.103) (0.302)   
Duality        0.010 0.034 
        (0.034) (0.099) 
Insider Voting Power        0.171 0.437 
        (0.120) (0.327) 
Board Independence        0.275** 0.750** 
        (0.125) (0.358) 
Board Size        0.048*** 0.128*** 
        (0.008) (0.024) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.653 0.685 0.649 0.684  0.691 0.726 0.652 0.684 
Observations 10,090 10,090 13,020 13,020  10,406 10,406 5,453 5,453 
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Table 6 Addressing Endogeneity Concern 
This table presents the results of several tests used to address the endogeneity concern. Panel 
A presents the results of firm fixed effects regressions, Panel B presents the results of the trend 
analyses, while Panel C presents the results of the difference-in-difference analyses using a 
propensity-score matched sample. The sample period for Panel A and B is the whole period 
from 1992 to 2016; the sample period for Panel C is the 2 years before and after CEO turnover 
(i.e., from pilot to non-pilot CEO and vice versa) during the period 1992 to 2016. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix. Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
  (1) (2) 
Variable  Rating1  Rating2   
Pilot CEO  -0.189***  -0.511***  
 (0.059)  (0.154)  
Size  0.343***  1.079***  
 (0.031)  (0.093)  
Leverage  -0.002  -0.004  
 (0.002)  (0.004)  
ROA  1.033***  3.334***  
 (0.157)  (0.430)  
Loss  -0.016  -0.055  
 (0.023)  (0.061)  
Cap_inten  0.426***  1.312***  
 (0.086)  (0.249)  
Int_cov  0.004***  0.013***  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  
Subord  -0.121***  -0.388***  
 (0.034)  (0.095)  
LogVol  -0.534***  -1.639***  
  (0.034)  (0.097)  
LogVega  0.002  -0.001  
 (0.008)  (0.023)  
LogDelta  0.042***  0.133***  
 (0.012)  (0.031)  
Age  -0.006**  -0.015**  
 (0.002)  (0.007)  
Tenure  0.001  0.004  
 (0.003)  (0.009)  
Military  0.008  -0.086  
 (0.048)  (0.133)  
      
Firm FE  YES  YES  
Year FE  YES  YES  
Adj-R-squared  0.856  0.890  
Observations   13020   13020   
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Panel B: Difference-difference analyses 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Rating1 Rating2 
   
Post × Turnover -0.128** -0.310* 
 (0.0613) (0.172) 
Post -0.0601 -0.409* 
 (0.0673) (0.233) 
Size 0.342** 1.045*** 
 (0.142) (0.344) 
Leverage -0.00545 -0.0114 
 (0.00431) (0.0108) 
ROA 1.192* 4.218*** 
 (0.604) (1.252) 
Loss -0.0104 0.0835 
 (0.101) (0.205) 
Cap_inten 0.0245 0.0811 
 (0.331) (0.782) 
Int_cov 0.00227 0.00647 
 (0.00178) (0.00422) 
Subord 0.0181 -0.0463 
 (0.122) (0.288) 
LogVol -0.226* -0.773** 
 (0.133) (0.345) 
LogVega 0.0255 0.0598 
 (0.0316) (0.0846) 
LogDelta 0.0675* 0.263*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0997) 
Age -0.00646 -0.0296 
 (0.00800) (0.0183) 
Tenure -0.00592 0.00228 
 (0.00923) (0.0260) 
Military -0.0354 -0.112 
 (0.0971) (0.373) 
   
Observations 498 498 
R-squared 0.936 0.961 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.901 0.939 
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Panel C: Inclusion of lead and lag indicators for pilot CEOs 
 
                         (1)                                    (2) 
VARIABLES Rating1 Rating2 
   
Before
–2 -0.018 -0.044 
 (0.058) (0.134) 
Before
–1 -0.047 -0.059 
 (0.053) (0.131) 
Before0 -0.098* -0.206* 
 (0.051) (0.112) 
After1 -0.280*** -0.767*** 
 (0.073) (0.205) 
After2+ -0.247*** -0.728*** 
 (0.074) (0.213) 
Size 0.346*** 1.074*** 
 (0.029) (0.088) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
ROA 1.034*** 2.968*** 
 (0.149) (0.379) 
Loss -0.014 -0.051 
 (0.022) (0.058) 
Cap_inten 0.428*** 1.338*** 
 (0.082) (0.237) 
Int_cov 0.005*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Subord -0.117*** -0.394*** 
 (0.032) (0.088) 
LogVol -0.536*** -1.548*** 
 (0.032) (0.085) 
LogVega 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.022) 
LogDelta 0.041*** 0.118*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) 
Age -0.005** -0.012** 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
Tenure 0.000 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.008) 
Military -0.002 -0.122 
 (0.044) (0.123) 
   
Observations 13,020 13,020 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.855 0.893 
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Table 7 Path Analysis  
This table reports the results of path analyses that examine the relation between pilot CEOs and 
corporate credit ratings through the direct path of rating agencies’ assessment of managerial risk 
tolerance and the indirect paths of the level (Future_TobinQ) and the variance of future firm value 
(Future_Vol). The following models are estimated: 
 
Rating1(or Rating2) = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + 2Future_TobinQ + 3Future_Vol                    (3A) 
+ βkControls + Industry FE + Year FE + 𝜀 
Future_TobinQ        = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + Industry FE + Year FE + µ                                        (3B) 
Future_Vol               = 0 + 1Pilot CEO + Industry FE + Year FE + 𝛹                                                             (3C) 
 
where controls are the control variables included in equation (1); all the variables are defined in 
Appendix. The path coefficient 1 is the magnitude of the direct path from Pilot CEO to the rating 
variables. The path coefficient 1×2 (1×3) measures the magnitude of the indirect path from 
Pilot CEO to the rating variables mediated through Future_TobinQ (Future_Vol). The table reports 
the path coefficients of interest, p(X1, X2), which stands for the standardized path coefficient.  The 
significance of the indirect effect is estimated using the Sobel (1982) test statistics. 
 
 (1) (2) 
  
Rating1 
 
Rating2 
Direct Path 
     p(Pilot CEO, Rating1/Rating2) = β1 
 
-0.249*** 
 
-0.688*** 
 
Mediated Path for Future_TobinQ 
  
     p(Pilot CEO, Future_TobinQ) = 1 -0.184*** -0.184*** 
     p(Future_TobinQ, Rating1/Rating2) = 2 0.215*** 0.628*** 
     Total Mediated Path for Futute_TobinQ (=1×2) -0.039*** -0.115** 
 
Mediated Path for Future_Vol 
  
     p(Pilot CEO, Future_Vol) = 1 0.040** 0.040** 
     p(Future_Vol, Rating1/Rating2) = 3 -0.867*** -2.665*** 
     Total Mediated Path for Future_Vol (=1×3) -0.035** -0.108*** 
 
Controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
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Table 8 Cross-sectional Analyses of the Relation between Pilot CEOs and Corporate Credit Ratings 
This table presents the regression results of the cross-sectional analyses of the relation between pilot CEOs and corporate credit ratings 
conditional on: product market competition (High_HHI), industry growth (HighGrowth), and financial constraints (High_FinCon). 
High_HHI is an indictor variable that equals one if a firm is in a highly concentrated industry (i.e., the sales concentration of the industry 
is in the top quantile of the year). HighGrowth is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is in a high growth industry (i.e., 
healthcare, medical equipment, computer, and pharmaceutical industry) defined following Bonsall et al. (2016). High_FinCon is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm faces serious financial constraints and delayed investments due to issues with liquidity (i.e., 
delaycon constructed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) is in the top quantile of the industry-year). The sample period is from 1992 to 
2016. All variables are defined in Appendix. Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 Rating1 Rating2 
       
Pilot CEO -0.282*** -0.743*** -0.195*** -0.521*** -0.184*** -0.524*** 
 (0.059) (0.171) (0.055) (0.161) (0.065) (0.188) 
Pilot CEO×High_HHI 0.289*** 0.695**     
 (0.105) (0.336)     
High_HHI -0.069* -0.223**     
 (0.040) (0.109)     
       
Pilot CEO×HighGrowth   -0.546*** -1.460***   
   (0.193) (0.546)   
HighGrowth   0.142 0.475   
   (0.143) (0.490)   
       
Pilot CEO×High_FinCon     -0.076*** -0.239*** 
     (0.024) (0.070) 
High_FinCon     -0.281** -0.554* 
     (0.115) (0.313) 
Size 0.310*** 0.941*** 0.310*** 0.940*** 0.289*** 0.884*** 
 (0.018) (0.053) (0.017) (0.052) (0.021) (0.062) 
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Leverage -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) 
ROA 1.116*** 3.488*** 1.110*** 3.466*** 0.957*** 2.600*** 
 (0.203) (0.599) (0.202) (0.597) (0.230) (0.645) 
Loss -0.112*** -0.344*** -0.113*** -0.348*** -0.095** -0.313*** 
 (0.034) (0.097) (0.034) (0.096) (0.038) (0.105) 
Cap_inten 0.069 0.272* 0.072 0.279* 0.075 0.257 
 (0.049) (0.147) (0.049) (0.147) (0.056) (0.168) 
Int_cov 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Subord -0.256*** -0.807*** -0.255*** -0.803*** -0.228*** -0.715*** 
 (0.037) (0.114) (0.037) (0.113) (0.040) (0.118) 
LogVol -0.875*** -2.716*** -0.875*** -2.716*** -0.875*** -2.654*** 
 (0.034) (0.101) (0.034) (0.101) (0.041) (0.119) 
LogVega 0.028*** 0.069*** 0.029*** 0.072*** 0.044*** 0.120*** 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.027) 
LogDelta -0.063*** -0.183*** -0.063*** -0.184*** -0.066*** -0.213*** 
 (0.014) (0.041) (0.014) (0.040) (0.015) (0.042) 
Age 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
Tenure 0.007** 0.019* 0.006* 0.018* 0.007* 0.025** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) 
Military -0.027 -0.108 -0.020 -0.091 0.018 -0.019 
 (0.041) (0.122) (0.041) (0.121) (0.046) (0.133) 
Future_Vol -0.349*** -1.034*** -0.349*** -1.032*** -0.369*** -1.112*** 
 (0.029) (0.084) (0.029) (0.084) (0.033) (0.091) 
Future_TobinQ 0.185*** 0.547*** 0.182*** 0.538*** 0.158*** 0.489*** 
 (0.018) (0.053) (0.018) (0.052) (0.020) (0.060) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.665 0.699 0.666 0.699 0.666 0.702 
Observations 11,619 11,619 11,619 11,619 7,063 7,063 
 
 
